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The Institutional Entrepreneur as Modern
Prince: The Strategic Face of Power in
Contested Fields
David Levy and Maureen Scully 
Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical framework that situates institutional entrepreneurship
by drawing from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to understand the contingent stabi-
lization of organizational fields, and by employing his discussion of the Modern Prince
as the collective agent who organizes and strategizes counter-hegemonic challenges. Our
framework makes three contributions. First, we characterize the interlaced material, dis-
cursive, and organizational dimensions of field structure. Second, we argue that strategy
must be examined more rigorously as the mode of action by which institutional entre-
preneurs engage with field structures. Third, we argue that institutional entrepreneurship,
in challenging the position of incumbent actors and stable fields, reveals a ‘strategic face
of power’, particularly useful for understanding the political nature of contestation in
issue-based fields.
Keywords: institutional entrepreneurship, strategy, hegemony
Introduction
Institutional entrepreneurs play a pivotal role in creating or changing institu-
tions (Clemens and Cook 1999; Fligstein 1997; Greenwood and Suddaby
2006). As a specific mechanism for institutional change, ‘institutional entre-
preneurship represents the activities of actors who have an interest in partic-
ular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new
institutions or to transform existing ones’ (Maguire et al. 2004: 657). This
emphasis on the dynamics of political contestation contrasts sharply with the
more traditional focus on structural pressures inducing convergence, confor-
mity, and stability among relatively passive and homogeneous actors.
Drawing from eclectic sources such as social movement theory, the ‘old’ insti-
tutional theory, and discourse theory (Greenwood and Hinings 1996;
McAdam and Scott 2005; Phillips et al. 2004), institutional entrepreneurship
literature has made valuable empirical and theoretical contributions to our
understanding of institutionalization as an ongoing political process that
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Building on these foundations, we develop a theoretical framework that
draws from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as the contingent stabilization of
socioeconomic systems and his discussion of the Modern Prince as the collec-
tive agent who transcends such systems through critical analysis, organizational
capacity, and strategic deployment. This framework advances our understand-
ing of institutional entrepreneurship in three respects. First, to understand how
institutional entrepreneurs effect change within institutional fields, ‘an interme-
diate level between organization and society’ (Greenwood et al. 2002: 58), it is
vital to characterize field structures and instabilities. Our framework highlights
the interlaced material, discursive, and organizational dimensions of field struc-
ture. Second, institutional entrepreneurs are ‘interest-driven, aware, and calcu-
lative’ (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006: 28). We contend that institutional
entrepreneurship must take strategy seriously as the mode of dynamic interplay
between entrepreneurs and fields. Third, we argue that institutional entrepre-
neurship, in challenging the position of incumbents and overcoming field sta-
bility, reveals a ‘strategic face of power’. This framework is particularly useful
for considering institutional entrepreneurship within controversial ‘issue-based
fields’ (Hoffman 1999) in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
engage with business actors, though it also holds relevance for understanding
processes of political contestation in fields where competition is ostensibly
commercial or technological (Garud et al. 2002; Munir and Phillips 2005).
The following section reviews the institutional entrepreneurship literature
and identifies three areas of weakness, relating to field structure, strategy, and
power. We then introduce the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and political
strategy, noting points of connection with institutional theory. The third section
discusses the implications of these ideas for our understanding of field struc-
tures and strategies, and develops a strategic conception of power by which
institutional entrepreneurs, even if located in a subordinate position, can shift
field structures to their advantage.
Theoretical Background
Field Structure
The increasing attention paid by institutional theory to politics, interests, and
strategy has been accompanied, somewhat paradoxically, by a growing empha-
sis on the discursive structure of fields. Institutionalists have made valuable
contributions to understanding the embeddedness of technologies and markets
in institutional structures (Fligstein 2001a; Garud and Karnoe 2001;
Granovetter 1985). In rejecting economic determination of the social, however,
institutional theory has tended to neglect the role of the material dimension in
structuring fields.
Institutionalists have traditionally sought to understand organizational behav-
iors that could not be attributed to competitive market pressures (Scott and Meyer
1994). ‘To survive, organizations must accommodate institutional expectations,
even though these expectations may have little to do with technical notions of per-
formance accomplishment’ (Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1025). Since Meyer
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and Rowan’s (1977) study of the legitimation of school practices, researchers
have focused on how ‘the persistence of institutionalized practices and structures
cannot be fully explained by their technical virtuosity or unparalleled efficiency’
(Colomy 1998: 266). Rather, institutions persist as ‘socially constructed, routine-
reproduced programs or rule systems’ (Jepperson 1991: 149), undergirded by
‘models, schemas, or scripts for behavior. Consequently, institutions endure
because these models become “taken-for-granted” through repeated use and inter-
action or “legitimate” through the endorsement of some authoritative or powerful
individual or organization’ Clemens and Cook (1999: 445). This hint of coercive,
or regulative pressure, complements cognitive and normative forces in stabilizing
institutions (Scott and Meyer 1994).
The organizations inhabiting institutions are often distinguished from more
abstract institutional governance mechanisms (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006:
28). Scott and Meyer (1994: 56) defines organizational fields as ‘a community
of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose partic-
ipants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors
outside the field’. Increasingly, however, scholars employ a more expansive
conception of field that includes ‘two constitutive elements: a set of institutions,
including practices, understandings, and rules; and, a network of organizations’
(Lawrence and Phillips 2004: 692). This more encompassing definition sug-
gests the mutually constitutive nature of organizations and institutions, and per-
mits greater heterogeneity and even conflict within fields. Social movement
(SM) theory has been influential in developing a conception of fields as politi-
cally contested terrain (McAdam and Scott 2005). ‘More than a mere aggregate
of organizational players, however, fields exhibit distinctive “rules of the game”,
relational networks, and resource distributions that differentiate multiple levels
of actors and models for action’ (Rao et al. 2000: 251). Hoffman’s (1999: 352)
analysis of environmental practices in the chemical industry illustrates how
‘field constituents are often armed with opposing perspectives rather than with
common rhetorics. The process may more resemble institutional war than
isomorphic dialogue.’
Institutions are increasingly understood as discursive constructions.
‘Discourses, put simply, are structured collections of meaningful texts’ (Phillips
et al. 2004: 636), including the meaning systems embedded in routine practices.
Discourses are thus closely related to ‘institutional logics’, defined as the ‘belief
systems and associated practices that predominate in an organizational field’
(Scott et al. 2000: 170), or ‘taken-for-granted, resilient social prescriptions’
(Greenwood and Suddaby 2006: 28). The concept of discourse is more than a
semantic substitution, as it opens up a range of theoretical and methodological
approaches (Fairclough 1992).
The poststructural connotations of the term present some limitations, how-
ever. Discussions of institutional conformity have traditionally included an ele-
ment of rational choice; non-compliance could risk formal sanctions, social
ostracism, or economic costs. The concept of discourse is more diffuse and pen-
etrating, constituting identities and interests, while leaving little room for dis-
cretion or sovereign authority. Moreover, a discursive focus risks obscuring
material dimensions of field structures and strategies. For example, Munir and
02-078109-Levy.qxd  3/26/2007  8:05 PM  Page 3








Phillips’ (2005: 1669) examination of Kodak’s transformation of photography
into a simple consumer practice proceeds from the premise that ‘institutions are
social constructions produced by discourses’. They consequently ‘focus on how
Kodak managed to strategically embody its interests in the evolving institu-
tional framework through carefully planned and executed discursive practices’
(2005: 1667), rather than the development of low-cost roll film cameras.
Similarly, the development of Canadian whale watching was contingent not just
on the emergence of a positive macro-cultural discourse, but also on commer-
cially viable techniques for whale location (Lawrence and Phillips 2004). A
limited focus on discursive dimensions of field structures thus constrains theo-
rization of strategies to transform them.
Strategy
Institutional entrepreneurship can be understood as strategic action:
‘Institutional strategies are patterns of organizational action concerned with
the formation and transformation of institutions, fields, and the rules and
standards that control those structures’ (Lawrence 1999: 168). Similarly,
Fligstein (1997: 398) describes ‘strategic action‘ as ‘the attempt by social
actors to create and maintain stable social worlds’. In elaborating these
strategies, the literature has drawn from SM theory to examine how institu-
tional entrepreneurs ‘lead efforts to identify political opportunities, frame
issues and problems, and mobilize constituencies’ (Rao et al. 2000: 240). A
discursive conception of institutional structure, however, has led to a focus
on discursive strategies (Hensmans 2003; Lounsbury et al. 2003; Maguire
and Hardy 2006). If fields ‘are not objective, predetermined structures, but
processes of social construction and meaning creation, wherein social order
is negotiated’ (Hardy and Phillips 1998: 218), then one key strategic task is
to forge awareness of relationships among actors. Maguire et al. (2004) iden-
tify three strategies used by successful entrepreneurs: the occupation of posi-
tions with wide legitimacy and bridging diverse stakeholders; the
theorization of new practices; and connecting these practices to stakeholders’
routines and values. Institutional entrepreneurs actively import and translate
discourses from other arenas (Boxenbaum 2006; Creed et al. 2002; Lawrence
and Phillips 2004: 693). Though frequently motivated by competitive pres-
sures (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006), their strategies are usually conceived
in discursive terms. One notable exception is the study of radio broadcasting
by Leblebici et al. (1991), which describes how entrepreneurs developed
economic strategies, including advertising and ratings systems, to profit from
a public good.
Institutional entrepreneurship presents a ‘paradox of embedded agency’ (Seo
and Creed 2002: 226), the puzzle of how actors can ‘change institutions if their
actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution
they wish to change’ (Holm 1995: 398). Institutional scholars locate agency and
dynamics in the interstices and contradictions of plural, overlapping, and
incomplete logics (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Clemens and Cook 1999; Phillips,
et al. 2004). 
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‘Discourses are never completely cohesive and devoid of internal tensions, and are
therefore never able totally to determine social reality ... These limits of discourse pro-
vide a substantial space within which agents can act self-interestedly.’ (Hardy and
Phillips 2004: 304) 
While this perspective creates theoretical space for strategy, it is not a theory of
strategy. The centrality of strategic action at the interface between agents and
institutions warrants a deeper analysis of strategy as a theoretical construct and
political activity, indeed, as a form of power.
Power
Power is clearly implicated in the political contestation to reshape institutions,
though it is rarely examined explicitly. It has long been recognized that institu-
tions reflect and reproduce power relations (Seo and Creed 2002; Stinchcombe
1965: 194). Fields exhibit a ‘dominance hierarchy’ (DiMaggio and Powell
1983) or ‘dominance order in which a few groups of actors operate at the apex
while others survive on the bottom’ (Rao et al. 2000: 262). Institutional entre-
preneurship highlights that: ‘Institutional change is thus a political process that
reflects the power and interests of organized actors’ (Maguire et al. 2004: 658),
whose goal is to reconfigure power relations and distributional outcomes
(Fligstein 1997; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence and Phillips 2004).
SM theory has contributed to a political perspective of ‘how entrenched, field-
wide authority is collectively challenged and restructured’ (Rao et al. 2000:
276). It has also provided a greater appreciation of the different positions of
field ‘dominants —; those individuals, groups, and organizations around whose
actions and interests the field tends to revolve’, and ‘challengers —; those indi-
viduals, groups and organizations seeking to challenge the advantaged position
of dominants or fundamental structural-procedural features of the field’
(McAdam and Scott 2005: 17). While field dominants have superior material
and network resources to engage in entrepreneurship (Greenwood and Suddaby
2006), challengers generally have stronger incentives and fewer institutional
constraints (Clemens and Cook 1999: 452; Rao et al. 2000: 262). The strategic
implications of their differential resources and locations have not been thor-
oughly explored, however.
At the core of institutional theory is a structural theory of power (Clemens and
Cook 1999; Jepperson 1991; Sewell 1992). Institutions reproduce themselves by
establishing routines, disciplining deviance, and constructing agents’ identities
and interests (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Phillips et al. 2004). McAdam and
Scott (2005: 10–11) note the Weberian roots of ‘institutionalized power: power
coded into structural designs and bolstered by widely shared cultural norms and
ideologies’. By contrast, they observe how SM scholars draw from more critical
traditions to analyze ‘change efforts that require the conscious mobilization of
marginalized or disenfranchised elements’. Institutional entrepreneurship has
drawn upon SM theory to consider the strategies of institutional entrepreneurs,
but has not linked these strategies to an agent-based theory of power. Implicit in
several studies is a notion of power based on institutional location and access to
material and discursive resources. Hardy and Philips (1998: 219), for example,
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have argued that ‘formal authority, the control of critical resources, and discursive
legitimacy’ are important sources of power for institutional entrepreneurs.
Similarly, Fligstein (2001b: 123) observes that ‘the basis of a group’s power [is]
its claim over resources and rules’. Yet field dominants will generally have supe-
rior access to these resources of power on account of their structural location.
What is lacking is a theory of how institutional entrepreneurs can overcome struc-
tural power by outmaneuvering field dominants.
Fligstein (1997) argues that challengers need to rely on ‘social skills’, such as
bargaining, framing, and alliance building (Garud et al. 2002: 203). SM theory
offers a more overtly political ‘collection of skills, from persuading others on an
idea or tactic to maintaining commitments and morale, from allocating resources
to recognizing potent weak points, from writing and speaking to taking initia-
tives in moments of decision, from forming alliances … to issuing authoritative
commands’ (Barker et al. 2001: 6). Alinsky (1971) uses the metaphor ‘political
jujitsu’ to describe turning the force of the power structure against itself. We sug-
gest that these skills represent a strategic repertoire, and we draw from the clas-
sical tradition of Machiavelli and Gramsci to develop a strategic theory of power
that enhances our understanding of institutional entrepreneurship.
Hegemony and Political Strategy
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who rejected economic determinism
and emphasized the political significance of a cultural ‘superstructure’ in dialec-
tical tension with material forces. Gramsci has been profoundly influential in
many areas of social theory, particularly cultural studies (Hall 1986) and labor
process theory (Burawoy 1979). Recent scholarship on social movements and
political strategy has drawn from Gramsci’s conception of hegemony and polit-
ical contestation (Barker et al. 2001; Hardt and Negri 2000; Sanbonmatsu
2004). Though Gramsci has received barely a mention in institutional theory,
his influence is discernible in the scholarship stream that draws from dialectical
Marxism, with its attention to contradictions and praxis (Benson 1977; Clemens
and Cook 1999; Seo and Creed 2002; Sewell 1992). Our exploration of
Gramsci’s work reveals a deeper relevance for institutional entrepreneurship
and continues a tradition of appropriating key Gramscian ideas while shifting
the focus from class conflict toward more local struggles.
Critical to our perspective on field structure is Gramsci’s concept of hege-
mony, referring to the contingent stability of a social structure that protects
the privileged position of a dominant alliance, or ‘historical bloc’ (Gramsci
1971). Hegemony relies on coalitions and compromises that provide a mea-
sure of political and material accommodation with other groups and on ide-
ologies that convey a mutuality of interests. Crucially, the values and interests
of the dominant group are represented as those of society as a whole. For
Gramsci (1971: 328), ideology constitutes ‘a conception of the world that is
implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations
of individual and collective life’. Ideology thus represents a relatively coherent
and politically charged discursive structuring of the social. Dominant groups
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exercise power through the coercive and bureaucratic authority of the state,
dominance in the economic realm, and the consensual legitimacy of civil soci-
ety. When hegemony is established, ‘the development and expansion of the
[dominant] group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of
a universal expansion … In other words, the dominant group is coordinated
concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups’ (Gramsci
1971: 181).
As with institutions, hegemonic stability entails a balance of coercion and
consent, though the discursive component receives most attention (Laclau and
Mouffe 1985; Mumby 1997). Williams (1980) has described hegemony as ‘the
central, effective and dominant system of meanings and values, which are not
merely abstract but which are organized and lived … [and] appear as recipro-
cally confirming’. Hegemony implies the articulation of discourse into a coher-
ent ideology and an array of institutions that project the moral and intellectual
leadership of dominant elites. Many theorists are wary, however, of instrumen-
talist interpretations of this ‘dominant ideology thesis’ in which elites unilaterally
impose ideologies to induce behavior inimical to people’s interests (Abercrombie
et al. 1980; Clegg 1989). Poststructuralist sensitivities countenance neither the
implication of objective interests in the ‘false consciousness’ of passive dupes
nor the sovereign subjectivity of elites, who somehow stand outside ideology.
Attempting to rescue hegemony from these charges, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:
67) assert that ideology is ‘an organic and relational whole, embodied in insti-
tutions and apparatuses, which welds together a historical bloc around a number
of basic articulatory principles’.
Gramsci’s hegemony represents a nuanced notion of consensual stability in
which even dominant ideologies remain fragmented and contradictory. Parallel
to the institutional literature, the persistence of competing ideologies opens
space for agency and resistance, in which people can develop a ‘critical con-
ception of the world’ (Gramsci 1971: 324). For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemonic
politics are premised on ‘antagonism’, described by Contu (2002: 166) as ‘the
experience of the limits to any structuration, order, symbolization, legislation’.
This contestability leads Mumby (1997: 344) to assert that the ‘equation of
hegemony with the notion of “domination through consent” elides the extent
to which Gramsci’s formulation is dialectical, emphasizing a complex inter-
play between power and resistance’. The burden of securing hegemonic stabil-
ity does not lie with ideology alone, however. Gramsci proposed a dialectical
relationship between society’s material ‘base’ and ideological ‘superstructure’.
Crucially, hegemony is rooted in an alignment of material, organizational, and
discursive forces within a complex social matrix. Gramsci describes the inter-
action of these factors in securing workplace consent:
‘it was relatively easy to rationalize production and labour by a skilful combination of
force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion
(high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political propa-
ganda) … Hegemony here is born in the factory.’ (Gramsci 1971: 285)
The dialectical perspective suggests that fields are at once more entrenched, as the
economic and discursive dimensions are mutually reinforcing, yet also more rife
with contradictions. Markets and technologies are constructed within particular
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cultural contexts (Bijker et al. 1987; Callon 1998), as has been well recognized in
institutional theory (Fligstein 2001a; Lawrence and Phillips 2004; Munir and
Phillips 2005). Yet, discourse does not reproduce itself in a vacuum, but rather
within a political economy of advertising, consumerism, and academe (Golding
and Murdock 1991; Morgan 2001).
The third pillar of hegemonic stability lies in the organizational domain.
Gramsci used the term ‘historical bloc’ in a dual sense: to refer to tangible orga-
nizations and alliances among dominant actors, as well as the alignment of eco-
nomic and ideological forces undergirding them. Historical blocs thus resemble
organizational fields in their more expansive conception. SM scholars have par-
ticularly emphasized how ‘mobilizing structures’, such as industry associations
and unions, actively channel economic and ideological forces (McAdam and Scott
2005: 14). International relations scholars have employed Gramscian concepts to
examine the ideological and strategic function of transnational industry organiza-
tions in generating policy consensus, forging coalitions, and socializing profes-
sionals into business values, language, and practices (Cox 1987; Gill 1995).
The nature of consent and stability is conditioned by a variable balance of
forces, sometimes more tethered to dominant ideologies, other times more anchored
in economic incentives. Marginalized groups might express more overt opposi-
tion but lack the resources or organizational capacity to mount a challenge. From
this perspective, consent is a multifaceted, contingent concept that connotes
strategic acquiescence as much as ideological colonization. Tensions within and
between the dimensions of hegemonic structures generate opportunities for strate-
gic agency, giving rise to a dialectical dynamic, ‘a relation of forces in continu-
ous motion and shift of equilibrium’ (Gramsci, 1971: 172).
Understanding hegemony was, for Gramsci, a prerequisite to political action.
Inspired by Machiavelli, Gramsci posited the Modern Prince as the collective
agent of praxis, of ‘political action embedded in an historical system of inter-
connected yet incompatible institutional arrangements’ (Seo and Creed 2002: 3).
For Gramsci (1971: 133), ‘the Modern Prince is at one and the same time the
organizer and the active, operative expression’ of the collective will. Gramsci
demonstrated a keen awareness of the importance of strategy and organization
if subordinate groups were to outmaneuver those with superior material and
coercive means. Effective strategy requires skillful analysis, so the Modern
Prince ‘must be able to map, as accurately as possible, the complex terrain of
parties, movements, institutions, economic forces — in short the dynamic balance
and relations of will and force — in order to exploit places in the hierarchical net-
work of power nodes, where hegemony is unstable or breaks down’ (Sanbonmatsu
2004: 135). To this end, the Modern Prince would also provide decisive leadership
to exploit critical windows of opportunity.
The Modern Prince would be active on two levels. In the realm of ‘grand
strategy’ Gramsci (1971: 233) used the term ‘war of position’ to suggest how
subordinate groups might avoid a futile frontal assault against adversaries
entrenched in the ‘fortresses and earthworks’ (1971: 238) of civil society.
Instead, the war of position entails a longer-term strategy, coordinated across
multiple bases of power, to gain legitimacy, develop organizational capacity, and
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win new allies. Led by ‘organic intellectuals’ serving as educators and organizers,
the Modern Prince would also act more locally to enhance the capacity of core
organizations fomenting change. In Gramsci’s epistemology, lived experience is
a source of knowledge and consciousness, but in the tradition of the Frankfurt
School and Freire’s (1972) radical pedagogy, organic intellectuals could facili-
tate the emergence of a critical worldview that links diverse experiences to an
emergent ideological framework (Clemens and Cook 1999: 449; Sanbonmatsu
2004: 192). Far from being an external elite imposing its own ideas and agenda,
organic intellectuals are immersed in ‘active participation in practical life’
(Gramsci 1971: 10), facilitating an emancipatory process. The Modern Prince
thus represents the unity of philosophy and politics, of theory and practice
(Fontana 1993; Gramsci 1971: 333).
Implications for Institutional Entrepreneurship
Many parallels exist between the role of the Modern Prince in challenging hege-
monic structures and institutional entrepreneurs in shifting fields. A common
focus is the nature of contingent stability in complex socioeconomic systems
comprising networks of actors interacting with structural forces. The following
section discusses several contributions of the Gramscian framework to our under-
standing of field structures, and the strategies and modes of power wielded by
institutional entrepreneurs as they contest them. We illustrate our argument with
the case of the international distribution of AIDS drugs to developing countries,
which we briefly introduce here (for details see Sell and Prakash 2004; Spar and
Bartlett 2005; Vachani and Smith 2004).
The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in the USA during the 1980s provoked
activist groups such as ACT UP to pressure pharmaceutical companies and
health authorities to devote more resources to combating the disease. By the
early 1990s, new antiviral drugs had dramatically cut mortalities, but the annual
cost of treatment was around US$10,000–15,000 per person. Infection and mor-
tality rates in developing countries soared during the 1990s, affecting more than
30 million people by 2000, with several countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffer-
ing infection rates of over 15%. The cost of patented antiviral drugs was clearly
prohibitive for widespread use in these countries. In the latter 1990s, Thailand,
South Africa, and Brazil developed plans to issue compulsory licenses to enable
local companies to produce generic versions of the drugs, reducing the cost of
medication to about US$350 per person.
At the urging of western pharmaceutical companies, the USA responded by
threatening trade sanctions, invoking TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights) clauses of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. TRIPS
entered the WTO framework in 1994, following a well organized campaign by
more than 1,500 companies from various sectors interested in extending inter-
national enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). In response, an
international group of NGOs, including gay rights activists, African American
organizations, and generic drug manufacturers, developed the Access Campaign
02-078109-Levy.qxd  3/26/2007  8:05 PM  Page 9








to advocate for low-cost drug access in developing countries. The multilevel
alliance enrolled the support of developing country governments and key mul-
tilateral organizations like the World Health Organization. The Access
Campaign successfully pressured the Clinton administration to reverse its posi-
tion in 1999, forcing concessions from the pharmaceutical industry. We return
to this case as we develop our framework below.
The Nature of Field Structure
We propose that the concept of hegemony is a fruitful way of understanding the
contingent stabilization of politically contested fields. Indeed, institutional the-
orists in the dialectical tradition employ a similar conception of fields charac-
terized by contradictions and competing logics (Clemens and Cook 1999). Seo
and Creed (2002: 225) draw from Benson’s (1977) interpretation of dialectics
in which fields are ‘part of a larger whole composed of multiple, interpenetrating
social structures operating at multiple levels and in multiple sectors. However,
the linkages between the components are neither complete nor coherent.’
Stability in such fields is more precarious than is usually portrayed in institu-
tional theory, requiring ongoing political efforts. McAdam and Scott (2005: 18)
acknowledge this precariousness in their effort to synthesize SM and institu-
tional theory: ‘The stability we have in mind is rather the hard fought for and
fragile state of affairs that Zysman (1994) terms an “institutional settlement” —
an agreement negotiated primarily by the efforts of field dominants (and their …
allies) to preserve a status quo that generally serves their interests.’ From this
perspective, field stabilization does not rest narrowly on isomorphism and nor-
mative consensus, but rather on a negotiated outcome reflecting a balance of
forces. For McAdam and Scott, a particular institutional settlement is based on
an alignment of the institutional logic, actors’ interests, and the governance
structure of the field. These forces broadly map onto the discursive, material,
and organizational dimensions of hegemony. Indeed, an institutional arrange-
ment that commands widespread consent but serves particular interests embod-
ies the essence of hegemony.
The key contribution of the concept of hegemony is to view field stabiliza-
tion as an alignment of forces within an organic totality. Garud and Karnoe
(2001: 11) display an appreciation for this when they describe how ‘constituent
elements of a technological field begin working with one another, they become
“aligned” and begin reinforcing one another. Meanings of objects constituting
these fields emerge through a process of negotiation and provisionally stabilize.’
They describe the dialectical development of technological artifacts and support-
ing cognitive frames as the ‘coevolution of minds and molecules’ (2001: 18); we
would suggest that the inclusion of economic interests points to a coevolution
of ‘minds, molecules and money’.
These dynamics and fragile institutional settlements are illustrated in the AIDS
drugs case, in which diverse actors have shifting and only contingently aligned
interests. Prior to the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry was generally willing to
overlook patent infractions in developing countries, because of their small mar-
kets. Moreover, patents were still widely viewed as a privilege rather than an
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absolute property right (Sell and Prakash 2004). Rapid growth in some emerging
economies, combined with the growing importance of IPR-based international
trade, led key industrial sectors to push for a new settlement that extended IPR
enforcement internationally. In the process, IPR infractions were reframed as
piracy. Industry successfully exploited concerns about competitiveness to graft its
agenda onto multilateral trade institutions. The stability of this settlement was
secured, temporarily at least, through the organizational capacities and gover-
nance structures of the WTO and issue-specific industry associations.
The growing AIDS crisis energized actors whose material interests diverged
sharply from branded pharmaceutical companies and who did not share the dis-
cursive construction of IPRs as sacred property. Indeed, increasing awareness of
the relationship among the pharmaceutical industry, public health, and trade
governance exacerbated tensions over defining relevant boundaries for the shift-
ing field. The institutional settlement that emerged after 1999, achieved a
degree of hegemonic stability by accommodating the interests of major actors
and providing a common discursive framework. Branded pharmaceutical com-
panies protected their profitability by limiting their concessions to a small group
of existing antiviral drugs for a specified set of markets. Simultaneously, they
deflected more serious regulatory and reputational threats. Developing coun-
tries were able to manufacture and even export generics, while greatly expand-
ing access to low-cost drugs. IPRs gained broad recognition and protection,
except for specific public health emergencies. New tensions soon arose, how-
ever, as the HIV virus mutated and older drugs became ineffective.
Pharmaceutical companies again attempted to enforce patents on newer drugs,
and some developing countries with growing IPR-based industries are now
more reluctant to challenge them (Lakshmanan 2007).
Strategy
The strategies of institutional challengers and defenders need to encompass the
multiple dimensions in which fields are structured. The complex, multidimen-
sional nature of fields also creates more opportunities for field dominants to
stumble and for challengers to apply strategic skills and identify contradictions
and points of leverage. Discursive moves that project common interests consti-
tute an important component of strategies to build alliances. Maguire et al. (2004:
658) argue that: ‘Key to their success is the way in which institutional entre-
preneurs connect their change projects to the activities and interests of other
actors in a field.’ Material and organizational facets of strategy are also crucial,
however.
The Access Campaign illustrates how smart strategy encompassing discur-
sive, material, and organizational elements could outmaneuver a coalition of
well resourced multinational companies. While business castigated IPR viola-
tions as piracy, the Access Campaign advanced the framing that patents caused
death and represented a form of ‘medical apartheid’. The campaign found a
point of economic leverage at Yale University, which owned a key antiviral
patent and organized students to pressure Yale to waive its rights. The campaign
successfully mobilized the material interests of generic drug companies, health
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agencies, and developing country governments, while offering a compromise to
branded pharmaceutical companies that only marginally affected their profits
and secured substantial reputational benefits. The careful construction of a
broad alliance and the execution of specific tactics required considerable orga-
nizational and political capacity. The Access Campaign leadership demonstrated
strategic vision and skill in shifting the struggle away from the corporate-
dominated WTO forum and into the media and public health arenas, while lever-
aging the vulnerability of politicians around the 2000 US elections.
Institutional entrepreneurs, like the Modern Prince, must attend not only to
external ‘grand strategy’ but also to enhancing the agility, adaptive capacity, and
creativity of organizations leading institutional change efforts (Eisenhardt and
Martin 2000; Mintzberg 1990). Organizational agility could constitute an
advantage for challengers when field dominants are securely embedded within
existing institutional logics, technologies, and practices (Greenwood and
Suddaby 2006: 29). Ganz’s (2000) study of the successful organizing of Californian
farmworkers sheds rare light on the role of ‘strategic capacity’: movement lead-
ership teams that are flexible, imaginative, knowledgeable, well networked, and
accountable. They develop strategy through dialogue with their membership,
‘each participant drawing on their specific knowledge about the overall situa-
tion, about other movements, about potential supporters and their values, about
tactical matters’ (Barker et al. 2001: 10). Effective leadership teams serve, in
effect, as Gramsci’s organic intellectuals.
Institutional Entrepreneurship and Power
Our discussion of institutional entrepreneurship points to a strategic face of
power. While Gramsci’s hegemony is widely understood as a form of structural
power, much less attention is given to his analysis of strategies for challenging
hegemony. If institutional entrepreneurs successfully shift the asymmetries of
influence and resources within a field’s web of relations, they clearly exercise
power. It is a facet of power that transcends the possession of material resources,
formal authority, or discursive legitimacy; rather, it relies on the skillful coordi-
nation and deployment of resources, a sophisticated analysis of field structures
and processes, diplomatic acuity in constructing alliances, and creative agility
in responding to evolving circumstances (Levy et al. 2003). The Access
Campaign, for example, lacked the financial resources of the pharmaceutical
industry or the authority of the WTO. Yet, it was able to envision and construct
a new field configuration by shaping, mobilizing, and aligning the material
interests of diverse actors while promoting a discursive frame to underpin the
new settlement. In the process, the campaign developed the organizational and
strategic capacity to shift field boundaries, mobilize new actors, and leverage
the formal authority of states and multilateral organizations.
Our focus on strategy as a form of power draws from the classical theoretical
tradition of Sun Tsu and Machiavelli (Fontana 1993). Clegg comments that,
within this tradition:
‘power is simply the effectiveness of strategies for achieving for oneself a greater scope
for action than for others implicated by one’s strategies. Power is not any thing nor is it
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necessarily inherent in any one; it is a tenuously produced and reproduced effect which
is contingent upon the strategic competencies and skills of actors who would be power-
ful.’ (Clegg 1989: 32) 
Fleming and Spicer (2005: 95) suggest that Clegg’s integrative ‘frameworks of
power’ model reflects ‘what we might call a Machiavellian theory of power.
This involves conceptualizing power as a network of relations in which actors
are embedded.’
Our invocation of a strategic face of power invites comparison with other
‘faces of power’, to employ Lukes’ (1974) metaphor. Lukes critiqued the con-
ceptualization of power as a resource possessed by A that coerces B to do some-
thing that B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). Lukes viewed this ‘first face
of power’ as overly behavioral and episodic, neglecting systemic aspects of power.
The second face was based on Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) observation that
dominant actors frequently manage agendas to exclude certain policies from
any consideration. Lukes advocated a ‘radical view’, his third face of power, in
which ‘the sovereign power exert[s] dominion over the very ingredients of indi-
vidual consciousness: the appetites, passions, and especially interests that these
individuals have’ (Clegg 1989: 29). Foucault’s poststructuralist critique shares
Lukes’ interest in the constitutive power of discourse, but breaks sharply from
the notion of agents consciously wielding power over others. For Foucault, sov-
ereign agency dissolves as identities and subjectivities are themselves consti-
tuted and disciplined by discursive texts and practices that suffuse everyday life.
Sanbonmatsu (2004: 137) contends that, as a result, Foucault undertheorized
strategies for challenging power.
Our conception of strategic power is relational, systemic, and dialectical, in
that agents are institutionally constituted and constrained, yet have the capacity
to transform these fields of relations. Institutional entrepreneurs are primarily
concerned with shifting field-level norms, routines, and rules rather than directly
coercing a particular adversary (Garud et al. 2002; Lawrence and Phillips 2004:
690). Actors may exert episodic agency and exploit the resource dependencies
of others, but these instantiations of power are rooted in a wider context. For
Gramsci (1971: 172), strategy is the domain of the ‘active politician who wishes
to create a new balance of forces’ rather than the ‘diplomat’ whose ‘specific
activity is not the creation of some new equilibrium, but the maintenance of an
existing equilibrium within a certain judicial framework’. Jepperson (1991)
makes a similar distinction between ‘human behavior’, which reproduces exist-
ing institutions, and ‘human action’, which entails deliberate, reflective depar-
tures from institutionalized practices. Strategic power resonates with Laclau
and Mouffe’s (1985) conception of counter-hegemonic politics as the struggle
to articulate diverse social grievances and contests into a more coherent forma-
tion. Strategy can thus be a generative form of power, expanding the scope of
action and freedom for broad sectors of society.
Strategic power is both constituted and constrained by the indeterminacy, con-
tingency, and inertia of fields. The social world possesses sufficient regularity to
enable purposive action, yet is not so structurally rigid that it extinguishes mean-
ingful agency. Moreover, bounded rationality in the face of complexity and
uncertainty prevents the calculation of rules yielding deterministic outcomes;
02-078109-Levy.qxd  3/26/2007  8:05 PM  Page 13








strategy is necessarily a form of ‘satisficing‘ (Simon 1962). Some strategies will
yield superior outcomes, though we can never be sure which ones will succeed a
priori. This indeterminacy is critical, because if field dominants held the levers
of power in a deterministic world, there would be no scope for political con-
testability. Yet, the same indeterminacy constrains the power of institutional
entrepreneurs, as they cannot fully comprehend and control a complex field
(Lane and Maxfield 1996). Their power is also constrained by field inertia and
path-dependence. In Garud and Karnoe’s (2001) terms, strategy is a process of
‘mindful deviation’, of steering an evolving field rather than creation de novo. A
range of alternative futures is possible, but not an infinite set of possibilities. In
Gramsci’s words, (1971: 172): ‘The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but
he neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own
desires and dreams.’
The counter-strategies of institutional defenders trying to protect their posi-
tion within a field present another constraint on the power of institutional entre-
preneurs. SM theory has paid limited attention to the activities of ‘incumbent
social movement organizations’ (Hensmans 2003) or ‘counter-movements’ (Rao
et al. 2000: 268), while empirical research on institutional entrepreneurship pro-
vides several examples of institutional defense, such as Microsoft’s efforts to
block Sun (Garud et al. 2002) and competitors’ opposition to Kodak’s moves
(Munir and Phillips 2005). Attending to the agency of defenders avoids the
problematic asymmetry of viewing entrepreneurs as external agents endeavoring
to change institutional fields stabilized by impersonal, structural forces. Although
defenders enjoy systemic advantages from their location in a hegemonic
system, both defenders and challengers are institutionally embedded agents
employing similar strategic repertoires, suggesting a degree of theoretical
equivalence (Sell and Prakash 2004).
Power and Hegemonic Accommodation
The interaction between the strategies of institutional entrepreneurs and defend-
ers frequently gives rise to a characteristic pattern of limited accommodation
while preserving, or even reinforcing, the essentials of field power structures.
Pragmatic entrepreneurs, seeking to legitimize their claims, frequently use insider
language and practices to drive change (Meyerson and Scully 1995) and ‘embed
calls for change within accepted models’ (Clemens and Cook 1999: 459).
Dominant groups typically respond with material concessions that address the
most serious grievances, discursive strategies that co-opt challengers’ linguistic
forms, and organizational moves to build ‘partnerships’ with moderate elements
while zmarginalizing more radical groups (Barker et al. 2001: 7; Levy 1997;
Levy and Egan 2003). These strategies generate ‘a continuous process of for-
mation and superseding of unstable equilibria between the interests of the fun-
damental group and those of the subordinate groups’ (Gramsci 1971: 182).
The interaction between Canadian AIDS activists and the pharmaceutical
industry illustrates this process of hegemonic accommodation. Maguire et al.
(2004: 668) describe how ‘treatment advocacy‘ activists successfully established
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a national institution for the pharmaceutical industry to exchange information
with the AIDS community. Instead of challenging industry dominance with radi-
cal language, treatment advocacy ‘was presented as a new style of activism,
focused on working with the pharmaceutical industry rather than fighting against
it’. In agreeing to establish a forum for consultation, industry not only enhanced its
legitimacy but also gained financially from the marketing value of this information
and from expanded insurance coverage. Moreover, the new Canadian forum rep-
resented a minor, local concession in the contemporaneous context of the bitterly
fought war of position waged by AIDS activists against IPRs. Though the Access
Campaign is generally credited with having ‘won’ the struggle to allow low-cost
generic drugs in developing countries, this institutional settlement was also a hege-
monic accommodation. The campaign was successful precisely because it focused
pragmatically on a narrow set of drugs for a small group of countries and relied on
a loophole in the TRIPS legal framework allowing exceptions for medical emer-
gencies (Sell and Prakash 2004). The campaign thus implicitly reinforced the over-
all legitimacy of IPRs and the WTO, while conceding the dominant role of
pharmaceutical companies in key aspects of field governance, such as pricing and
research priorities. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies quickly moved to claim
credit for expanded drug access and embraced the discourse of corporate social
responsibility. The power of even the most skillful institutional entrepreneurs is
constrained by the nesting of issue-level fields within wider, well entrenched insti-
tutions. Institutional entrepreneurship has been characterized using salient
episodes and discontinuities but is an ongoing, situated process.
Conclusions
This paper extends the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and political strategy
to provide a richer and more coherent view of the engagement by institutional
entrepreneurs with field structures. Fields are viewed as networks of actors
within a contingently stable alignment of material, organizational, and discur-
sive forces. These elements mutually reinforce each other to enhance field sta-
bility, yet the tensions within and between them open space for strategic agency.
The existing literature on institutional entrepreneurship resonates with many of
the themes in this paper, yet does not address them directly in a sustained, ana-
lytical manner. Our framework connects with an established theoretical tradi-
tion to provide a more integrative and nuanced understanding of institutional
entrepreneurs, who, like Gramsci’s Modern Prince, develop and deploy strate-
gies to transform field structures in the face of institutional inertia and resis-
tance from institutional defenders.
The significance of strategic action by institutional entrepreneurs points to a
strategic face of power, which relies on skilled analysis, deployment, and coor-
dination to outmaneuver dominant actors with superior resources. Simultaneously,
an understanding of the nesting of fields within more firmly entrenched institu-
tions highlights the limits of strategic power and illuminates the contours of
hegemonic accommodation. The achievement of immediate goals might reveal
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deeper power structures, creating strategic dilemmas and obscuring conceptions
of interests. One implication of viewing institutional entrepreneurship as an
ongoing strategic contest is that success or failure is difficult to assess in
absolute terms at any specific juncture, given the indeterminacy of field dynam-
ics and the fallibility of strategy.
Viewing a field as an organic totality provides a useful corrective to the ten-
dency to posit a sharp distinction between institutional and competitive, or tech-
nical, environments. Lawrence (1999) pursues this distinction into the strategic
domain, arguing that competitive strategy operates within existing rules and
structures, while institutional strategy is geared toward changing them. Yet if
economic forces are important in structuring institutions, then competitive strat-
egy is simply one component of institutional strategy, equally as imbricated in
politics. Recognizing the multiple and interdependent dimensions of a field,
institutional entrepreneurs frequently pursue integrated strategies across these
dimensions in an attempt to reconfigure the field and gain a measure of advan-
tage within a complex web of relations.
Gramsci’s conception of the Modern Prince offers a number of insights and
paths for future research into institutional entrepreneurship. On a theoretical
level, the role of the Modern Prince as a catalyst for auto-emancipation suggests
a path out of the structure-agency imbroglio, one that locates the kernel of
change within an internal process of organizing and education rather than external
shocks or the importation of foreign discourses. More pragmatically, it encour-
ages a deeper exploration of the relationship between institutional entrepreneurs
as leaders and their organizations (Barker et al. 2001). Existing literature either
personifies entrepreneurs as individuals or as unitary organizational ‘black
boxes’ devoid of internal processes.
Strikingly, the Modern Prince is an emotive leader as much as a calculating
strategizer, a mythological figure reminiscent of some contemporary business
heroes. For Gramsci (1971: 126), the Modern Prince exemplifies a Sorelian
myth, a ‘concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered people to
arouse and organize its collective will’. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) similarly
refer to the ‘cosmological tasks‘ of social movement leaders, who generate a
mobilizing vision of the future. The Modern Prince both creates and embodies
this vision, a ‘myth-prince‘ (Gramsci 1971: 128) generating passionate identi-
fication toward this fusion of idealized leadership with its cause. Jones and
Spicer (2004: 236) suggest, using Lacan, that the mythical, undefinable charac-
ter of the entrepreneur serves ‘to structure phantasmic attachment’.
Though the emotive, mythical character of the entrepreneur might well be
critical to a project of institutional transformation, we need to remain alert to the
discursive power and strategic implications of the term ‘entrepreneurship’, par-
ticularly for theorizing progressive projects of institutional transformation (Zald
2002). ‘Entrepreneurship’ conjures masculine images of heroic individuals amass-
ing wealth rather than collective action toward more democratic, egalitarian goals.
Entrepreneurship discourse successfully mobilizes capital and people in ‘repro-
ducing the current relations of economic domination’ (Jones and Spicer 2004:
237). Since the 1990s, most top business schools have centers or programs on
entrepreneurship, predictably crafted from institutionalized logics; most are
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funded by and celebrate financially successful entrepreneurs, the very emblems
of a contemporary nobility constructed on a gendered discourse of charismatic
achievement. The organizational literature offers several alternative terms: ‘bureau-
cratic insurgency’ (Zald and Berger 1978), ‘grassroots activism in the workplace’
(Scully and Segal 2002), and ‘tempered radicalism’ (Meyerson and Scully 1995).
The SM literature offers terms conveying more radical images of activism.
Substituting terms legitimated within the mainstream is precisely a clever strate-
gic move, but one that highlights the strategic dilemmas discussed in this paper;
the pragmatic approach risks diversion from deeper structural change unless
connected to a longer-term strategic project.
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